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ARTICLES

Are External Reasons Impossible?*
Rachel Cohon
It is clear that our desires and aims provide us with some reasons for
action. Are there also reasons for action that are not contingent upon
what desires or aims we have? In his article "Internaland External Reasons,"'
Bernard Williams answers a version of this question in the negative. He
offers an argument intended to show that there are no reasons to perform
actions that would not satisfy the agent's desires, aims, or other "motives."
I shall try to bring into sharp focus what I take to be the weaknesses in
this argument. But I also wish to show that, although the argument is
unsuccessful, Williams does successfully identify the main hurdle that
his opponents must surmount if they are to prove that desire-independent
reasons are possible.
According to Williams there are two mutually incompatible ways to
interpret a sentence of the form "P has a reason to A" or "There is a
reason for P to A."2 On the first or internal reading, it is a necessary
condition for the truth of the sentence that P have some motive or aim
which will be served or furthered by his A-ing, so that if he has none, it
is not the case that he has a reason to A. On the second or external
reading, the reason sentence does not imply that the agent has any such
motive or aim and so "will not be falsified by the absence of an appropriate
motive" (p. 17). More explicitly, "any model for the internal interpretation
must display a relativity of the reason statement to the agent's subjective
motivational set, which I shall call the agent's S.... An internal reason
statement [a statement interpreted in the internal way] is falsified by the
absence of some appropriate element from S" (p. 18). Although no precise
definition of a subjective motivational set is given, Williams says that S
contains desires, and "such things as dispositions of evaluation, patterns
of emotional reaction, personal loyalties, and various projects . .. em* I am grateful to Philippa Foot, Thomas E. Hill, Jr., and Warren Quinn for comments
on an earlier version of this paper.
1. Bernard Williams, "Internal and External Reasons," in Rational Action: Studies in
Philosophy and Social Science, ed. R. Harrison (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
1979), pp. 17-28. All further references to this article will be given parenthetically within
the text.
2. The two forms of sentences do not necessarily collect the two interpretations,
respectively; in some uses, both forms of sentences may be given the same interpretation.
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bodying commitments of the agent" (p. 20). (I shall follow Williams in
calling the desires and other desire-like factors in S "motivations" except
where, for neutrality's sake, I must call them simply "elements of S.")
Williams grants that our language contains statements understood in the
external way (external reason statements) but argues that none of them
can be true. That is, he denies that there can be any reasons for action
whose existence does not depend upon the agent's having something in
his subjective motivational set that the action would satisfy or fulfill.
About reasons in general Williams says: (a) If something is a reason
for action, it must be that people sometimes act for that reason, and
when they do, the reason must figure in some correct explanation of
their action. Also, (b) If something is a reason for action, it shows that
someone who acts on it is behaving rationally, in the sense that the agent
could come to acknowledge that she had this reason as a result of deliberation. Thus, as Williams conceives of reasons they have two basic features:
they can explain action, and they can provide rational support for action.
In light of this conception of reasons, Williams says an agent may believe
that something is a reason for her to act when it is not (she mistakenly
thinks an action will further a certain element of her S) and may fail to
believe that something is a reason for her to act when it is (she does not
know that a certain action would further an element of her S). These
are characteristics even of reasons that are properly described in internal
reason statements, reasons whose existence depends upon the agent's
having certain elements of S.
According to Williams's concept of deliberation, in deliberating one
can discover internal reasons, and one can also discover that what one
took to be internal reasons are not. On his view the recognition that
something is the causal means to something else is not a piece of deliberation, although it would play a role in deliberation. "A clear example
of practical reasoning is that leading to the conclusion that one has reason
to A because A-ing would be the most convenient, economical, pleasant
etc. way of satisfying some element in S" (p. 20). Another example is
"thinking how the satisfaction of elements in S can be combined, e.g. by
time-ordering" (p. 20). Others include removing elements from S and
adding elements to S by using one's imagination to get "a more concrete
sense of what would be involved" (p. 20).
Williams's argument falls into two parts. The first intends to show
that a putative external reason is, by itself, insufficient to explain action,
and something more is needed if it is to satisfy the requirement that any
reason for acting must be able to explain the action. The second part
starts by assuming that such a further factor could come into being, so
that the external reason could fulfill the explanatory requirement, but
argues that, given the way in which this 'something more' must come
into being, the putative external reason cannot satisfy the other requirement
on reasons, that they could be arrived at by the agent through rational
deliberation.
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Williams illustrates his argument with the story of Owen Wingrave
from the Benjamin Britten opera. Owen's father urges him to join the
army to uphold the family pride and tradition of military service. Owen
hates everything about military life and desires a different kind of life,
but his father nonetheless urges him to become a soldier. The father
could have expressed himself by saying that there was a reason for Owen
to join the army, and, given the condition of Owen's S, the father would
be giving this claim the external interpretation.
First, we are asked to suppose that there is indeed an external reason
for Owen to join the army. Since reasons must be able to figure in
explanations of action, Owen's external reason could be someone's reason
on a particular occasion and would figure in an explanation of that
person's action. But an external reason can be present even if the agent
for whom it is a reason is not motivated to act; Owen has a reason even
when he is not in the least inclined to join the army. Thus, if he eventually
does join the army, the external reason could not by itself explain his
action, for it was there when Owen was not motivated to join, and "nothing
can explain an agent's (intentional) actions except something that motivates
him so to act" (p. 22). Therefore, some additional explanatory factor, a
psychological link, is needed to explain Owen's action if he accepts his
father's claim and joins the army.
Presumably, the crucial link is Owen's believing the (external) reason
statement. Once he comes to believe that family honor is a reason for
him to enlist, he then has an appropriate motivation in his S, and in fact
comes to have an internal reason.3
Since reasons for action reveal the rationality of an action as well as
how it may be explained, Williams says that the agent must acquire this
new motivation "becausehe comes to believe the reason statement" (p.
23) and under the conditions of correct deliberation, rather than by some
nonrational process. He suggests that the external reason statement entails
that, "if the agent rationally deliberated, then, whatever motivations he
originally had, he would come to be motivated to [A]" (p. 24). But, by
hypothesis, there is no motivation in the agent's S for him to deliberate
from, to reach the new motivation that he acquires in coming to believe
the external reason statement. The new motivation is not a desire to do
3. The point here is not to collapse external reasons into internal reasons. True, once
the agent comes to believe the external reason statement, he is in the same condition as
an agent who has and believes she has an internal reason, so the difference between the
two sorts of reasons cannot be found in this situation. But they are different. We have seen
one difference already: when Owen had no interest injoining the army, the external reason
statement was nonetheless true of him, whereas an analogous internal reason statement
about his joining the army would not have been true. Here is a second difference: the
external reason statement has been true of Owen all along, but when he comes to believe
it he comes to have a new motivation. This does not happen when an agent comes to
believe an internal reason statement that has been true of her for some time, for she has
had an appropriate motivation in her S from the beginning.
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what would be the most pleasant, most economical, or most convenient
way to satisfy an element of S, nor is it a desire to follow a time plan,
nor is it related to the elements of S in the other ways mentioned in
Williams's account of deliberation. For if it were, the agent would have
had an internal reason to perform this action from the start. Therefore
it is impossible for an agent to deliberate rationally to the formation of
the motivation to act on an external reason. Thus it is never true that
someone has a reason to act regardless of the contents of her S.
Both parts of the argument fail.
To obtain his conclusion to the first part of the argument, Williams
depends upon the key premise that "nothing can explain an agent's
(intentional) actions except something that motivates him so to act." This
claim, which I shall call Premise M, is thoroughly plausible but owes its
plausibility to an equivocation. Once the equivocation is removed, the
premise turns out to say something question begging and probably false.
The reasoning in this first part of the argument is contained in full
in the following paragraph:
In considering what an external reason statement might mean, we
have to remember again the dimension of possible explanation, a
consideration which applies to any reason for action: if something
can be a reason for action, then it could be someone's reason for
acting on a particular occasion, and it would then figure in an
explanation of that action. Now no external reason statement could
by itself offer an explanation of anyone's action. Even if it were true
(whatever that might turn out to mean) that there was a reason for
Owen to join the army, that fact by itself would never explain
anything that Owen did, not even his joining the army. For if it
was true at all, it was true when Owen was not motivated to join
the army. The whole point of external reason statements is that
they can be true independently of the agent's motivations. But
nothing can explain an agent's (intentional) actions except something
that motivates him so to act. So something else is needed besides
the truth of the external reason statement to explain action, some
psychological link; and that psychological link would seem to be
belief. [P]'s believing an external reason statement about himself
may help to explain his action. [P. 22]
How are we to interpret Premise M, the claim that nothing can
explain an agent's intentional actions except something that motivates
him so to act? What does "something that motivates" mean here? The
key is in the two preceding sentences, "For if it was true at all [that Owen
had an external reason to join the army], it was true when Owen was
not motivated to join the army. The whole point of external reason
statements is that they can be true independently of the agent's motivations."
By "motivations" here he has to mean elements of S, because the whole
point of external reason statements, the characteristic that distinguishes
them from internal reason statements, is that they can be true even if
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the agent has no elements of S that would be served or furthered by
performing the action. Thus the next sentence, Premise M, claims that
nothing can explain an intentional action except a member of the agent's
S. Intentional action is impossible, or at least inexplicable, in the absence
of an element of S that the action serves or furthers.
This is a controversial claim whose truth is by no means obvious; in
fact, there are good reasons to think it false. Although it will not be
argued at length here, it seems to me that many actions are done intentionally and can be readily explained, even though there is no element
of the agent's S that the action serves or furthers. For example, on a
particular evening a man makes a sack lunch just as he does every evening;
he knows that tomorrow he plans to lunch in a restaurant with a colleague,
but as he performs his routine task he does not happen to make the
connection. Or, someone who has been given a posthypnotic suggestion
rises at a certain signal, gets a pencil and paper, and performs a calculation.
In another type of example, someone is swayed by a candidate's personality
and votes for him, without thinking about whether he wants the person
to have the job, when in fact he does not; or he buys a product out of
admiration for the athlete who promotes it because he is influenced by
the endorsement, although he has no expectation that the product will
be useful. These actions are clearly done intentionally. The agent knows
what he is doing and in some of the cases has to monitor his own behavior
through a series of steps. In none of these cases is the action accidental,
in the way that one may accidentally knock over a glass with a jerk of
surprise, knowing what one is doing but nonetheless not intending it.
Nor are these like the action of the person who intentionally walks forward
and in so doing unintentionally steps on the cat's tail, where he intends
to do what he is doing under one description but not under another.
On the contrary, in each of the above cases the agent would say that he
did the thing under the description I have given (made a lunch, did a
calculation, bought something), did it on purpose, meant to do it, did it
deliberately-all the marks of intentional action are there. These are not,
of course, very wise things to do. But some of our actions are not very
intelligent. The fact that an action is not intelligent, however, does not
imply that it is not intentional. Furthermore, each of these actions is
explicable; in fact, in describing them I have largely explained them.
Why did the man vote for Johnson when he believed Smith would make
a better chairman? He was influenced by Johnson's powerful personality.
Why did the woman get pencil and paper and perform a compoundinterest calculation? She had been given a posthypnotic suggestion to do
so at a certain signal, and the signal was given. Why did the man make
a sandwich this evening? Out of habit. Yet these actions do not serve or
further any elements of the agents' S's, and their explanations do not
mention any of the agents' desires, aims, projects, loyalties, or other
things Williams allows in an S. Thus it does not seem to be true that
nothing can explain an intentional action except an element of the agent's
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S that would be served or furthered by it, and it is unwise to take this
as a premise, as Williams does.
By doing so, furthermore, Williams assumes a large part of what he
is trying to prove. He is trying to prove that there can be no external
reasons because the considerations described in external reason statements
cannot qualify as reasons. To be a reason, for Williams, a consideration
must at least have his two features, the explanatory capacity and the
connection with rational deliberation. Williams's strategy is to assume
that there are some external reasons and perform a reductio. Thus he
assumes that there are some reasons that could be present in the absence
of any element of S (any "motivation") that would be served by the action,
and since they are reasons, they therefore satisfy his explanatory requirement, even in the absence of any appropriate element of S. It is
then open to Williams to try to prove that these putative external reasons
cannot, in fact, satisfy his explanatory requirement, but it is not open to
him to assume that they cannot. To assume, as he does here, that the
only thing that can explain an action is an appropriate element of S is
simply to assume that putative external reasons do not satisfy the explanatory requirement and therefore are not reasons. With this assumption
Williams could immediately conclude that the considerations described
in external reason statements cannot be reasons; he has begged the
question at the outset. It is only because he has not noticed the exact
contents and logical consequences of Premise M that he thinks he must
go on to the second part of the argument and show that external reasons
do not satisfy the rationality requirement.
It may be thought that in Premise M Williams does not actually
assume that putative external reasons do not satisfy his explanatory requirement. After all, the requirement only says that, if someone in fact
acts on a consideration, it must be capable of explaining the person's
action. From Premise M Williams merely infers that, when the agent acts
on the putative external reason, at that point she must have an appropriate
element of S; he does not infer that prior to action, when she had no
appropriate element of S but had the putative external reason, it was
not a reason. So, it may be argued, Williams's assumption, while unsupported by argument, is not question begging.
But the objection misconstrues Williams's explanatory requirement
on reasons. To be a reason for A-ing, a consideration C must be the kind
of thing that could be someone's reason on some occasion, so that if
some person P were to A and we were told, "He did it because of C," this
answer would explain the action.4 The requirement holds for all reasons,
even those on which no one in fact acts; it is a requirement on what
would be the case if someone were to act for the reason that C. If C
4. Of course, the explanatory requirement is a necessary but not a sufficient condition
on C's being a reason. Not everything that explains action turns out to be a reason for it,
but what cannot explain an action cannot be a reason for it.
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would not explain P's doing A were it to occur, then C is not a (complete)
reason. Suppose, for example, we wish to know whether the fact that
this fruit is a lemon satisfies the explanatory requirement on being a
reason for P to squeeze its juice into his tea. Were P to squeeze the juice
of this fruit into his tea, and in answer to our question "why did he do
it?" we were merely to be told "because it is a lemon," we would not be
getting an explanation. To explain the action one needs more-P likes
lemon in his tea, or P thinks tea with lemon is good medicine for his
cold, or the like. If a consideration, such as the fact that this object is a
lemon, would be insufficient by itself to explain action were the action
to be performed, then it does not satisfy the explanatory requirement.
And a consideration that does not satisfy the explanatory requirement
is not a reason-not where action occurs and not in cases where it does
not. Since there may be no relevant motivation when one has an external
reason, in assuming, as he does in Premise M, that a consideration cannot
explain an action without the help of a motivation, Williams is indeed
assuming that no external reason can satisfy the explanatory requirement.
Putative external reasons cannot fully explain action where it occurs
because other considerations must also be invoked; therefore they are
not themselves reasons in the first place. This is effectively what he has
assumed. It is surely not anything his opponent would grant him in
building his reductio.
The assumption is question begging, yet the paragraph quoted above
does not seem to beg any questions. Why does this illegitimate move tend
to escape our notice? Premise M has the ring of self-evidence. "But
nothing can explain an agent's (intentional) actions except something
that motivates him so to act." This seems obviously true because it inadvertently exploits the ambiguity of the word "motivates"and its cognates.
When we read "something that motivates" we are not thinking of it in
Williams's special sense, that of a desire, aim, pattern of emotional reaction,
or other element of S. We naturally slide into thinking of it in an ordinary
sense. Webster's
New InternationalDictionary,5for example, defines "motivate"
as "to provide someone with a motive, impel," and "motive"as "something
(as a need or desire) that causes a person to act." (It is interesting that
Williams mentions needs as things that are not necessarily elements of
one's S.) When we read "something that motivates" we naturally think
of just this meaning: something that causes the person to act. Of course
we cannot explain Owen's (or anyone's) action without mentioning whatever
it was that caused or impelled him so to act; this is what we found obvious
in reading that pivotal sentence. But this fact carries few implications
about the nature of whatever it was that caused him to act. The expression
"something that motivates" does suggest a cause of action that is inner
or mental; we would not accept, as fitting this description, a strong wind
5. Webster'sNew InternationalDictionary,Unabridged,3d ed. (Springfield, Mass.: G. & C.
Merriam Co., 1979).
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at one's back or just anything that might cause a person to do something.
(Hence the qualifier "as a need or desire" in the dictionary definition.)
The fact that we must mention a mental cause to explain intentional
action does not, however, imply that this 'whatever it was' must be a
desire, aim, loyalty, or other element of S. Although we cannot explain
Owen's action without mentioning its inner cause, for all Williams has
shown we might well be able to do so without mentioning any element
of Owen's S. And since, by the hypothesis with which the argument
began, there is initially no element of S suitable to figure in that explanation,
it had better be left open that something outside that set could cause the
action, if Williams is to give his opponent a fair chance.
It is important to recognize, here, that Williams cannot use the
dictionary meaning of "motive"to attain consistency throughout the quoted
paragraph. This is precluded by his conception of internal reasons. The
sense of "motive" or "motivation" he is committed to in Premise M is the
sense in which the agent with an internal reason has a motivation and
the agent with only an external reason does not. This cannot mean that
the agent with the internal reason is caused or impelled to act but the
agent with an external reason is not; that is not what constitutes the
asymmetry between the two kinds of agent. For Williams allows that
someone who has an internal reason can fail to know about the reason,
fail to be impelled to act, and fail to act. Either kind of reason can be
present in the absence of a motive in this sense. In either case Williams
could say that the reason alone is not enough to explain action because
it was there when there was no cause of action (no "motive" in the
dictionary sense). But he says the two cases differwith respect to motive,
so this cannot be the sense he means. What Williams really wants to say
is that when the agent comes to believe she has a reason and then does
act-when the cause of action does come into being-the internal reason
gives us a way of explaining the origin of this cause of action by appealing
to something that was there all along, an element of S, while the external
reason does not give us this way to explain where the cause of action
came from. Williams is really dealing with two different entities here and
wants to explain the generation of one (the cause of action) by the presence
of the other (the element of S) combined with a belief. But by equivocating
on the word "motivate," he smuggles in the assumption that these two
entities are one and the same. If they were a single entity, it would of
course follow that the cause of action cannot be present at all without
the element of S, which is what Williams concludes. But it would also
follow that the element of S cannot be present without the cause of
action, and hence without action, which is something Williams denies.
What Williams should be trying to demonstrate here is that one
cannot be moved (caused) to act intentionally without an element of S
that would be served or furthered by the action. He should be trying to
show that motivation in the sense of cause of action is dependent upon
motivation in the sense of an element of S. He needs to establish this
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point in order to proceed with his argument because the second part of
the argument is based on the claim that a new element of S must come
to exist when someone acts on a purely external reason. If it is possible
for someone to be moved to intentional action by something that is not
itself, and was not generated by, any element of S, that whole argument
cannot get started. The failure of the first part of Williams's argument
denies the second part its starting point.
However, it is not enough for Williams's opponent, who wants to
preserve external reasons, to deny the dependence of causes of intentional
action on elements of S or even to produce examples of intentional
actions that serve no element of the agent's S (as I did). Williams may
still argue that these S-independent causes of intentional action do not
yield rational action, the kind that the agent would choose in rational
deliberation, and hence that agents who are impelled by them are not
acting on true reasons. What the defender of external reasons has to do
is produce examples of actions of this S-independent sort whose rationality
is beyond question, about which we can truly say that an agent in such
circumstances who deliberated rationally would be caused so to act. Without
this, while Williams is still wrong to assume that intentional action requires
a suitable element of S, a great burden of proof lies with the defender
of external reasons (as can be seen even more clearly in the analysis of
the second part of Williams's argument below). Because Williams thinks
a new element of S is needed for action on the external reason, he goes
on to examine the possible genesis of that new element to see if it can
come to be by rational deliberation. If the defender of external reasons
thinks there is something else, not in S, that can give rise to action on
the external reason, she must examine the genesis of that entity to see
if it can come to be by rational deliberation. If it cannot, she has not
advanced toward showing that there are such things as external reasons.
The second part of Williams's argument also fails, however, even if
we disregard the effects on it of the errors in the first part. Suppose that
the agent who is moved to act on an external reason, where before she
had no element of S that would be served by so acting, now must acquire
an appropriate element of S. She must, Williams says, acquire this new
element by rational deliberation. Rational deliberation is a process of
associating the elements of S with one another according to broad (and
not fully determinate) rules that govern their relationships. There is no
rational deliberative process that could yield this new element, he says,
given that there are no old elements from which it could be derived.
It is important to notice which mistake Williams does not make here.
He says that the element of S needed to explain acting on an external
reason must be acquired by a rational process, yet he never says the
elements of S that explain action on internal reasons must similarly be
acquired by any rational process. No doubt some of these latter elements
of S are produced by deliberation from other elements of S, but Williams
does not and could not claim that every element of S that forms the basis
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of an internal reason was produced by deliberation from another element
of S. For, first, it is impossible for elements of S all to be derived from
other elements of S ad infinitum, for the sorts of reasons Hume delineates
in the Enquiry Concerning the Principles of Morals.6 And, second, some of
our desires that give rise to action are obviously not derivative but just
basic. If I play a record because I like it, or try some of a new dish because
I want to know how it tastes, I act on an internal reason based on an
element of my S that was not derived from any other but just happened.
In an example Williams mentions wanting a gin and tonic as a reason
to do something; surely the desire for a gin and tonic need not be
acquired by deliberation from other elements of S. Yet he seems to assume
that any element of S that could explain one's action on an externalreason
must be arrived at rationally. Why is it that these must involve deliberation
(from another element of S) while the elements that explain action on
internal reasons can just assail us? It may be thought appropriate to
object to this extra restriction on external reasons.
But there is nothing illegitimate in this assumption. Williams apparently reasons as follows. When someone has an internal reason, the
only ground there is for attributing the reason to her is the existence of
the relevant element of S. If it is an element of S-for example, a desire
that was not derived from others butjust arose, and it came into existence
at a particular time, then before the desire came to be, the agent had no
internal reason. With someone who has an external reason, however,
and later comes to have an appropriate element of S, the situation is
different. There must be some ground of attributing the reason to him
before he acquires the element of S. The existence of the element of S
cannot be the ground of attributing the reason, for he has the reason
when the element of S does not yet exist. Williams suggests what he takes
to be the only plausible ground the defender of external reasons could
offer. Although the agent has no element of S that would be served by
performing the action, he has a reason because, suggests Williams, if he
were to deliberate correctly, he would acquire an appropriate element
of S. The ground for attributing the external reason is the fact that
rational deliberation would yield the relevant element of S. Hence, there
are strict rationality requirements on the genesis of the element of S.
6. David Hume, Enquiry concerning the Principles of Morals, app. 1, consideration 5, in
Enquiries concerning the Human Understandingand concerning the Principles of Morals, 2d ed.,
ed. L. A. Selby-Bigge (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1902), p. 293; italics original: "Ask a man
why he uses exercise;he will answer, becausehe desiresto keep his health. If you then enquire,
whyhe desireshealth, he will readily reply, becausesicknessis painful. If you push your enquiries
farther, and desire a reason why he hatespain, it is impossible he can ever give any. This is
an ultimate end, and is never referred to any other object. Perhaps to your second question,
why he desireshealth, he may also reply, that it is necessaryfor the exerciseof his calling. If you
ask, whyhe is anxious on that head, he will answer, becausehe desiresto get money.If you demand
Why? It is the instrumentof pleasure, says he. And beyond this it is an absurdity to ask for a
reason. It is impossible there can be a progress in infinitum; and that one thing can always
be a reason why another is desired. Something must be desirable on its own account, and
because of its immediate accord or agreement with human sentiment and affection."
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Thus Williams has had to make an assumption about what constitutes
the ground for attributing external reasons. Perhaps he is wrong to think
the ground he chooses is the only plausible candidate, but he has not
introduced any ad hoc differences between internal and external reasons.
Williams goes wrong in another way. Recall that, by hypothesis, there
are no previously existing elements of S that the agent could deliberate
from to get the new element of S (call it E) that explains her A-ing, since
any such previously existing elements would have given her an internal
reason to A in the first place. Therefore, Williams reasons, she could not
acquire the new element E by rational deliberation. However E comes
to be, it is nonrationally, for all the forms of rational deliberation require
the presence of already existing elements of S. Now Williams admits that,
given the vagueness of his characterization of the contents of S and the
open-endedness of his account of deliberation, one might object that "it
is unclear what the limits are to what an agent may arrive at by rational
deliberation from his existing S" (p. 25). He points out that there are no
fixed boundaries to what counts as rational deliberation, as he understands
it, and he allows it to include "the use of the imagination to extend or
restrict the contents of the agent's S" (p. 25). Williams denies that this
absence of fixed boundaries poses any difficulty for the internal reasons
theorist, since for him it only shows that the set of reasons for an agent
to A is less determinate than one might have supposed. However, this
lack of clear limits on what counts as rational deliberation does pose a
problem for Williams, who wants to show that external reasons are impossible because there is no process of rational deliberation that could
yield E in the absence of old elements that the agent may deliberate
from. If Williams cannot specify which processes qualify as rational deliberation and which do not, he cannot rule out the possibility that there
is a qualified process (perhaps one employing the imagination) that can
produce E without working from any other elements of S. He needs to
show that the coming to be of E cannot be rational, and given his openended delineation of deliberation, he cannot do this.7
7. Of course, there has been, all along, a problem with the notion of an agent's S. In
places Williams writes as if he wishes S to contain dispositions to act as well as the other
things he mentions (p. 23). And while he generally sounds as if he wishes S to exclude
anything purely cognitive, such as beliefs, in some places he writes as if S is to contain
beliefs about what reasons one has (p. 20). Clearly, if S is sufficiently expanded, there will
come to be little or no disagreement between Williams and the so-called external reasons
theorist. For example, if S can contain beliefs, it would be possible for someone to derive
a new element of S from existing elements of S by theoreticalreason, deriving a belief from
other beliefs. This would surely be a rational way to arrive at a new belief. And if it is an
element of S, presumably it can explain action. Thus someone who thinks reasons may be
based on beliefs alone would be classified as an internal reasons theorist alongside someone
who claims that nothing can be a reason unless it is based on a desire. We begin to lose
the distinction between the two views, and there is little left that can be called an external
reasons theory. However, when one attempts to give a precise definition of the set S that
maintains an interesting distinction between internal and external reasons theorists, for
example by limiting S to desires and aims, Williams's argument becomes less and less
plausible.
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The failure of Williams's refutation leaves the defender of external
reasons with the job of finding some rational way in which an agent can
come to be moved to act on an external reason. Because Williams has
not shown that there must be an element of S to explain the action, the
theorist is not constrained to find an element of S that triggers the action
and is also rationally arrived at. However, she is constrained to find some
way in which acting on an external reason is really acting on a reason
and not acting on a whim of the moment, by providing a possible trigger
of the action, outside of S, that necessarily would operate if the agent
were well informed and rational. Williams has identified the task that
external reasons theorists have so far failed to perform (as far as I know):
they must find considerations that can obtain regardless of the agent's
desires, aims, or sentiments, that would move the agent to action if she
were well informed and thinking rationally. Therefore they must be able
to show that a well-informed agent who is not so moved is not thinking
rationally, and this requires them to point out what error she is making
in her practical reasoning.
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